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THE ROLE OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE SALE AND PURCHASE OF LAND. 
I. THE ROLE AND NATURE OF THE DEPOSIT. 
The deposit almost invariably forms part of the proceedings 
relating to the sale and purchase of land. Its nature is that 
of a monetary payment or is at least capable of being assessed 
in monetary terms and because of this the respective parties in-
volved can look upon it as something of inherent value. The 
payment of a deposit denotes that the parties have reached an 
important stage in their bargaining or are using it to seal a 
~oncluded contract. As negotiations move through contractual 
motions the deposit acquires greater status. It then expresses 
the purchaser's intention to perform the contract so that on 
default of his stated obligations it may be transformed into a 
compensatory sum to be awarded to the vendor for the loss of the 
bargain. This unique characteristic of the deposit changes it 
into a contractual tool far removed from its initial significance 
as a mere outlay of money within the natural course of dealings. 
A. Dual Nature of the Deposit. 
Before an analysis can be undertaken as to the nature, role 
and associated qualities of the deposit, within the contractual 
context of the sale and purchase of land, a differentiation must 
be made as between a deposit paid in a pre-contractual context 
and one where a contract is completed. 
The precontractual situation or what is frequently termed 
'subject to contract' may be interpreted as one where the parties 
have entered into negotiation or discussion as to the subject 
matter of a perhaps prospective transaction. Neither party is 
bound by the negotiations. The legal limbo created by the word 
'subject to contract' has been explained by Sachs of in Goding 
y . Fraser( 1) "This is a device which is often referred to as a 
(1) [1966] 3.All.ER.234 at page 239 
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gentleman's agreement, but which experience shows is only too 
often a transaction in which each side hopes the other will act 
like a gentleman and neither intends so to act if it is against 
his material interests." The deposit when offered in this con-
text has no binding force for it is paid as earnest money. The 
purchaser may make a demand for its return and the vendor has 
no claim to its title. 
The deposit when paid in the past contractual situation 
acquires legal standing and force. This is because the parties 
having competed in preliminary bargaining roles have reached a 
conclusive stage in the negotiations. Such negotiations are 
normally finalised by the drawing up and signing of a contract 
containing all the agreed terms. In this situation if the con-
tract is completed the deposit is taken into account as part of 
the purchase price. However if the contract goes off because 
of the purchaser's default he forfeits the deposit which may 
then be regarded as a compensatory sum to be awarded to the 
vendor, for the purchaser is creating an informal check on his 
actions, and is sealing his stated intentions with a gesture of 
good faith. Such considerations must play an important role in 
the initial determination of the purchaser as to the amount to 
pay as a deposit. It also acts as a guarantee that he will be 
wary of endangering the contract by any conduct which will result 
in its dissolution. 
The nature of the deposit and its associated qualities 
varies according to which context it is placed. There are how-
ever features common to them both which the parties and any 
critical observer could recognize.( 2) 
B. 
(2) 
Mechanical Aspects of the Deposits. 
The deposit also exists and operates within the regime of 
"The deposit is a valid contract and actionable according to 
English law, for the consideration furnishes for the contract 
is the parting of the possession of the goods". Commen~s 
drawn on this statement ref. "A difficulty in the Doctrine of 
Consideration''· 1886 5 LQR 34 by Erwin Grueber. · 
.... 
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the sale o_f land as an instrument of contractual convenience. 
This notion of convenience arises for the respective parties 
involved after an appraisal has been made as to what significant 
value the deposit represents to them both. By adopting the 
physical form of a monetary payment, both vendor and purchaser 
are aware of the value of the deposit, for money is the standard 
medium of exchange in transactions of sale and as such is a 
universally accepted symbol of power. So too, the practical 
aspects of the deposit is clearly borne out in the concluded 
contract context. For here the deposit represents a calculated 
percentage of the purchase price and is brought into account. 
At the same time the demand and payment of the deposit 
arises after preliminary negotiations have been entered into. 
It represents an important phrase has begun. Both parties 
realize their bargaining has solidified to a certain degree. 
The purchaser even in the pre-contract context has committed 
himself to the vendor. He has laid down this payment as a dis-
play of his willingness and potential capacity to compete in 
the transaction being formulated. Simultaneously the vendor, 
conscious of the value of such a payment, is able to discern 
the seriousness of the purchaser's intentions towards his 
property. 
The parties directly involved are not the only persons 
aware of the contractual significance of this stage of events 
arrived at. Others such as other interested purchasers, real 
estate agents, solicitors and even those who will be potential 
purchasers if negotiations break down can recognize that the 
payment of a deposit alters the format of the negotiations and 
legal nature of the relations as effected between vendor and 
purchaser. It also modifies their behavious towards the parties 
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directly ~oncerned. 
c. Psychological Value of the Deposit. 
The mere existence and role of the deposit forms not only 
part of the practical mechanics of the contract law relating to 
the sale of land, as a stage in the negotiations, but also it 
exists to satisfy a psychological need felt by both vendor and 
purchaser. The indirect effects produced by the alleviation of 
the psychological wants felt by both parties are more difficult 
to assess as they are more intangible in form. They are however 
I. 
just as important in ensuring that the course of bargaining runs 
smoothly. The form such effects take are relative in their 
meaning to either party as to when the deposit is paid. 
1 • In relation to the purchaser. 
The party interested in the property by offering a 
deposit is displaying his potential effectiveness as a 
purchaser and thereby hopes the vendor will look upon him 
' favourably. In the pre-contract situation he hopes to 
secure an exclusive option to purchase or as Lord Russell 
of Killowen in Sorrell & Another v.Finch( 3)stated "a foot 
in the door". This consideration is especially relevant 
if a housing shortage exists or if there is severe compet-
ition with respect to the property in question. The 
purchaser is appealing to the vendor's sense of moral 
commitment that he will honour this display of willingness 
to complete. 
In the concluded contract situation the purchaser 
become s aware of the greater significance the deposit holds 
to the extent that if he defaults in the performance of his 
contractual obligations the deposit will be forfeited. The 
(3) [1976] 2.All.ER. 371 at p.383(g) 
D. 
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fear of forfeiture must act as a deterrant to fickle 
behaviour and provide the purchaser with a compelling 
motive to perform the rest of the contract. 
2. In relation to the vendor. 
The vendor is, as the courts have held, reassured of 
the purchaser's capacity and willingness to complete the 
contract if a deposit is paid. Coupled with the threat of 
forfeiture in the concluded contract context such a consid-
eration must be very comforting to the vendor, for he can 
confidently assert that the purchaser will attempt as far 
as possible to complete the contract. 
In the pre-contract situation the vendor is, through 
the payment of a deposit, assured of a person interested 
in his property. He is placed in a favourable bargaining 
position by the presence of this pecuniary state. 
Emotional Considerations Attached to the Deposit. 
By appealing to these psychological values the role and 
nature of the deposit reflects the attitude held by most people 
that land possesses some form of inherent mystical value. Land 
is recognized by society as a symbol of power and wealth. To 
the ordinary man to attribute the land such status is understand-
able for contracts relating to the sale and purchase of land are 
usually the largest and most important transaction he will enter 
into - important not only in terms of the amount of finance trans-
ferred but also in the ultimate provision of a home in which to 
live and perhaps land on which to work. 
As a consequence of thi~ emotional considerations have been 
attached to such transactions. The idea that both parties should 
have a serious and respectful a ttitude not only to each other 
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but to the negotiations is extended to the arena of payment and 
forfeiture of the deposit. Lord McNaughton in poper v. Arnold(4) 
reinforces this idea - "if there is a case in which a deposit is 
rightly or properly forfeited it is I think when a man enters a 
contract to buy real property without taking the trouble to con-
sider whether he can pay for it or not". The judicial reasoning 
of this authoritative decision did not arise as an extension of 
conceptual legal rules. Emotionally charged considerations have 
considerable interplay in the formulation of such decisions. The 
courts recognize the status attributed to land and so will adopt 
an active role to formulate and implement a judicial rule to 
alleviate what they consider to be the 'unjustified imposition 
of loss'. If the purchaser defaults in performance of any terms 
of the contract the vendor is generally as a right entitled to 
forfeit the deposit. The loss he may have suffered may be no 
more than considerable disappointment and inconvenience. The 
dep0sit could thereby be regarded as a pre-estimation of a com-
pensatory payment to the vendor for the loss of a contract. 
Simultaneously the purchaser is being punished by the loss of his 
money for not assuming the appropriate attitude required of him, 
and that is to treat the contract seriously. The issue as to 
whether the doctrine of forfeiture can be regarded as analogous 
to the principles governing penalties or liquidated damages will 
be expanded upon later in the writing. 
The role the deposit performs and the purposes it serves 
validates the previous comments, the desire for contractual con-
venience, the need of a psychological reassurance for both parties, 
the appeasement of judicial qualms and the fortification of 
emotional attachments to the land. 
There is no compulsion to pay a depoat, although it has 
(4) (1889) 14.App-Cas.429 at p.436. 
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become an. accepted feature of the contract law relating to the 
sale an.d purchase of real property that purchasers will do do. 
In sales by auction it is usual for the contract or memoran.dum 
that is signed by the parties to contain a provision for the 
payment of a deposit. So too in contracts drawn up by a real 
estate agency similar provisions are included. In contracts by 
private treaty the deman.d for a payment is dependent on what 
terms the parties have agreed upon, although vendors would usually 
if not invariably insist upon such payments before they bind them-
selves to a contract. The importance of a deposit would obviously 
operate as a direct form of pressure bearing down upon the 
purchaser to comply with vendor's wishes. 
E. The Role of the Deposit. 
In the case of Soper v. Arnold( 5) Lord McNaughton laid down 
a definitive statement as to the role of the deposit. This 
comment has become the precedental statement as to deposits . 
given in the post contract situation "the deposit serves two 
purposes if the purchase is carried out it goes against the 
purchase money but its primary purpose is this - it is a guarantee 
tha t the purchaser means business11 .< 6 ) This latter expression 
of the deposit representing a security for performance is the 
justification given for the forfeiture doctrine. To attach such 
legal significance to this byproduct of contractual negotiations 
may or may not be warranted but this issue will be examined 
later. 
The de posit money paid during negotiations tha t are expressed 
to be 'subject to con tract' serves a different purpose. Such 
money is comm only referred to a s 'earnest money'. Unlike the 
deposit given under a concluded contract for sale - the payment 
(5) (1889) 14. App.Cas.429, 
(6) 1966 3. All ER. 234 at page 239. 
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of earnest money guarantees nothing for either party. The 
vendor has signed no contract and may refuse to enter into one 
without fear of reprisals of legal action. The purchaser may 
also demand the deposit's return at any stage irrespective of 
the vendor's wishes. This is because neither party have bound 
themselves to any contract or document, which the other can 
enforce. 
The purposes for which deposit moneys are required or paid 
are entirely relative to each party concerned. They appeal to 
the bargaining senses of each individual involved by serving to 
cushion the other party's psyche. J.R. Murdoch - in his article 
(6a) 
'The Lost Deposit' - suggests three possibtlites as to the role 
the deposit plays in relation to the vendor and purchaser and 
real estate agent. 
(1) In relation to the vendor: 
"The ability to purchase is one of the qualities which 
one looks for in a purchaser. Accordingly the requirement 
for the payment of a sum of money by way of deposit would 
seem to me permissable as evidence of some ability to 
purchase and or some indication that the proposed purchaser 
was not a man of straw."(?) The value of the deposit - if 
this is the consideration it alludes to - would appear to 
be minimal. A sum deposited in no way indicates that the 
depositor has the necessary wherewithal to complete the 
contract. What can be termed 'prospective purchaser' may 
be just making a notional investigation into the property 
market - for he can afford to be capricious in his actions 
as no fear of forfeiture exists - the persuasive element 
that acts as an assurance to the vendor that the purchaser 
will maintain a serious decorum in conjunction with his 
(6a) Vol.36 The Conveyancer 5. 
(7) Ryan v. Pilkington (1959) to All ER 689 at p.693 per Hodson L.J 
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offer. The only actual value that can be attributed to 
the deposit in relation to the vendor is that he is satis-
fied he has an interested and agreeable bargaining opponent. 
(2) In relation to the purchaser: 
A prospective purchaser may feel that it is in his own 
interest to pay earnest money in the hope of placing the 
vendor under a moral obligation not to sell to anyone else. 
Lord Denning in Burt v. Claude Cousins & Co. & Another(B) 
infers that such an assumption can be made after a review 
has been undertaken as to the practice adopted by real 
estate agents - in relation to property on the market when 
a deposit 'subject to contract' is paid. The property is 
usually taken off the market until negotiations are com-
pleted. It is thereby not subject to the scrutiny nor open 
to offers by other interested persons. Yet the occurance 
of such events is not an automatic consequence of the paying 
of earnest money. As to what procedure is adopted is 
entirely relative to the attitude of the parties at the 
time. 
(3) In relation to the real estate agent: 
Another reason why the demand and. payment for a deposit 
may be called for is the real estate agent's desire to safe-
guard his commission. However the estate agent being only 
a party who performs a very limited function - within the 
negotiations - he cannot support any legal action with 
which to sanction his mark of self-protection. This is 
because he seldom becomes entitled to a commission unless 
the purchase is completed and "he can only exercise an 
agent's lien over money to which the vendor is entitled".( 9 ) 
( 8) 1971 2 All ER. p. 618 
(9) Skinner v. the Trustee of propertv of Reed (1967) Ch.1194 
F. 
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His right to a commission depends upon the terms of his 
assignment. If his duties only extended to the finding 
of a prospective purchaser - then his entitlement to 
commission is secured. However, he is not entitled to 
deduct his commission out of a deposit - placedin his 
hands - for it is the purchaser's property, for as Sachs J. 
in Burt y._Qlaude Cousins held "in the event of the 
purchaser demanding its return, before any contract is 
concluded, he has to return the deposit to him."( 10) 
The deposit as a condition precedent. 
The above comments in relation to pre-contract deposits and 
deposits paid on or after the conclusion of a contract were once 
traditionally expressed in most legal textbooks,( 11 ) and are 
indisputedly followed in court decision. However, as a result 
of recent litigation it may be permissable to comment that the 
role of the deposit has acquired greater legal status. ~erhaps 
the seminal view of the deposit as representing itself as a 
guarantee or as a form of security of the purchaser's future 
performance might account for this change. Vendors will 
invariably insist on the payment of a deposit - for it requires 
the purchaser to seal his stated intentions. The general pattern -
of the deposit being paid - must lead to the final consequence 
that vendors will be hesitant or will refuse to enter into a 
contract unless it is paid. The courts have recognised this and 
have attributed a condition requiring payment of a deposit the 
status of a condition precedent. This was established in the 
recent decision of Myton Ltd. v. Schwab Morris .C 12) There the 
plaintiff had agreed to grant the defendant an underlease of a 
maisonette. It was a term of the agreement that the defendant 
(10) 1971 2 All ER. 611 at p.620(h) 
(11) Halsbury's Laws of England Vol.34 p.322 3rd Edition 
Williams on Vendor & Purchaser p.89 3rd Edition 
(12) [1974]1 All ER. p.327 
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would pay on or before the signing of the contract a deposit. 
The cheque for such a payment was dishonoured thrice - after 
which the plaintiff stated that the contract was rescinded 
because of the fact that they treated non-payment as a fund-
amental breach of the contract. The court adjudicated on the 
issue whether the plaintiff was bound by the contract. 
Goulding J. set down two grounds upon which he considered 
the vendor was not bound by the contract. The first ground -
stemmed from the maxim that the deposit is demanded and paid as 
a displa.y of the purchaser's ability and determination to 
complete the promise in due course. Following on from this, 
Goulding J. stated what he considered to be a general principle 
"the vendor in the normal case never intends to be bound by the 
contract without having the<Eposit in his own or his solicitor's 
possession as a protection against possible loss from default 
by the purchaser. 11 <13) He concluded by stating that the payment 
,of the deposit was a condition precedent to the contract t aking 
place, so that non-payment entitled the vendor to rescind the 
contract. 
Alternatively, Goulding J. held that if the payment of a 
deposit was not a condition precedent "it was a term of so 
radical a nature that the defendant's failure to comply with it 
would entitle plaintiff company to renounce further perform-
ance" . ( 14 ) 
Although the general practice as between vendor and 
purchaser provides for the payment of a deposit in most trans-
actions relating to land, there is abs olutely no compulsion to 
pay. However, following the decision of Myton Ltd. v. Schwab 
Morris( 15 ) where there is a provision in the contract relating 
(13) Ibid p.330. 
( 14) Ibid p. 331 . 
( 15) [1974~ 1 All ER 327 
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to the payment of a deposit, then if not complied with the 
vendor is entitled to set the contract aside. As most contracts 
contain a provision of this kind the purchaser if he wishes to 
compete must therefore forward a deposit. The deposit has there-
by emerged from the realm of procedural mechanics into something 
of greater legal consequence for both parties. It is a novel 
proposition that the payment of the deposit is a condition 
precedent to the liability of the vendor.( 16 ) Goulding J. also 
commented on the lack of authority on this point( 17 ) and just-
.. 
ified its absence by stating that in all probability it was too 
obvious a point to state, being generally understood by both the 
parties. This asswnption may however be incorrect in view of 
the fact t hat the parties involved are usually not aware of the 
legal status and consequences attributed to the deposit. They 
can only recognise that it is a procedural course commonly under-
taken. To impose upon the purchaser this extra requirement of 
' diligence may be an unwarranted display of judicial interference. 
In the 1974 Law Quarterly Review the following comment was 
made: "it seems to take the doc1rine of fundamental breach very 
far to apply it to the non-payment of a deposit 11 ( 18~ Goulding 
second ground is therefore s ubject to speculation and criticism, 
especially considerinc that the case he cited as being author-
itative,(19)no fundamental breach had occurred. That article 
concluded that Goulding J. should have approached the issue by 
asking the question whether the defendant could have specific-
ally enforced the contract. For, as the defendant wa s unable to 
make good the averment t hat he was willing to perform all terms 
of the contract he could not support an action of specific per-
formance. 
(16) 
( 17) 
( 18) 
( 19) 
April 1974 90.LQR.147 at p.148 Notes. 
L1974] 1. All ER. 321 at p.330 (h-j) 
LQR vol.90 April 1974 147 at p.148 
Mersey Street & Iron Co. Ltd. v. Naylor, Benson (1884) 
9 App.Cas.434 
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This .case was the subject of comment in an article termed 
"Bouncing Deposits 11 <
2o). There it was stated that if Goulding 
J.'s second proposition is preferred--~ the purchaser remains 
at the mercy of the vendor's choice~ 21 ) If his first propos-
ition is right "then the defaulting purchaser too is left free 
from his contractual obligations which may please him so long 
as the property market droops 11 <22 ). However the decision of 
Pollway Ltd. v. Abdullah.( 23 ) where it was held that an auctioneer 
was entitled to sue the purchaser on a bouncing cheque, may 
hinder a purchaser's actions. The vendor's position in such a 
contract was not clearly stated although it was held he could 
accept the non-payment as a repudiation of the contract and 
rescind the contract. "Not the slightest suggestion can be 
detected anywhere that payment of a deposit might conceivably 
be a condition precedent to the contract 11 .< 24 ) So too in the 
case of Edgewater Developments Co. (a firm) ·v. Bailey the Court 
of Appeal treated a provision for payment of a deposit as equiv-
alent; in effect to 'subject to contract', i.e. as being less 
contractual even than a condition precedent. The contract was 
held not to be binding for this and other grounds. "There is a 
great need for judicial cross-citation and reconciliation to 
I render the position following non-payment of a deposit as clear 
as that following payment11 <26 ). It is only fair to the parties 
involved to be able to predetermine the consequence of their 
actions. Parties should not be required to move blindly into 
contracts should any problems arise. 
(20) The Conveyancer - Notes 
(21) Ibid p.314 - i.e. being 
(22) Ibid p.314-315 
( 2 3) [ 1 9 7 4] I • W. LR 4 9 3 
(24) The Conveyancer - Notes 
(25) [1974] 188 S.J. 312 
(26) The Conveyancer - Notes 
vol.39 p.313 
able to rescind the contract 
vol.39 p.315 
vol.39 p.315 
G. 
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Unique characteristics of deposit. 
(1) A pre-estimate of damage. 
The deposit has, as a result of judicial decisions, 
been attributed other definitive terms. The principle 
governing the forfeiture or recovery of the deposit in the 
context of recission of the contract reveals its unique 
qualities and hence the descriptive terms. When the 
purchaser defaults the deposit is forfeited upon recission 
by the vendor. The rules applying to recission ab 1initio 
• 
provide for the equitable doctrine of restitutio in 
integrum whereby the parties are restored to their former 
positions as far as is practical. A deposit, having been 
paid, relates to the performance of a contractual oblig-
ation and it would follow from this that it should be 
returned to the purchaser. Forfeiture of the deposit in 
this context would appear to operate as ' an exception to 
this equitable doctrine. The courts recognize and enforce 
this exception and have based their decisions on policy 
considerations. 
The vendor should be indemnified for the loss he has 
suffered of his time, trouble and expense in making the 
initial sale.< 27 ) The forfeitable nature of the deposit 
may be looked upon as a genuine pre-estimate of damage 
which is likely to be suffered but which cannot be accurat-
ely quantified in advance.( 28 ) Whether such a principle of 
general application can be justified in individual cases is 
not an issue of judicial inquiry. They have accepted and 
formulated a generalised rule based on policy grounds that 
may arise from implication in contracts where forfeiture 
(27) Coates v. Sarich (1964) W.A.R.2 p,14 per Hale J. 
(28) Ibid 
• 
..... 
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clauses are absent. At the same time, equity has inter-
vened to relieve hardship that has resulted from the 
application of such a rule although they are resistant to 
disturb contractual terms agreed upon by the parties. 
(2) As a possessory lien. 
It is with the realm of recoverability of unpaid 
deposits by a non-defaulting vendor that the deposit has 
acquired further descriptive status. Brian Coote in his 
article 'Recovery of Unpaid Deposits 1 <29 ) suggests that 
it's name is analagous to that of a possessory lien. He 
gains support for this suggestion from the comments drawn 
by McMillan J. in Johnson v. Jones( 30) who stated "the 
nature of the deposit is such that before it can be for-
feited it must first be paid11 <31 ) and further on Coote 
stated "a deposit as a pledge or evidence required that 
it had to be held in possession if it was to operate at 
a1111 <32 ). Such statements are feasible in light of position 
an unpaid deposit plays in the context of recission. If 
the equitable doctrine of recission is applied, of rescind-
ing the contract ab initio, then the general nature of 
forfeitability of the deposit operates an exception to the 
doctrine of restitutio in integrum. If the deposit is 
paid before termination of the contract then the possessory 
rule justifies its retention. At the same time such a rule 
is used to deny the recovery of unpaid deposits. This 
state of affairs is contrary to the common law view of 
rescission that discharge for breach terminates the contract 
as to the future only, and leaves intact rights accrued up 
to the point of termination. 
(29) 5 NZ.U.LR. 292 
( 30) L1972J NZLR 313 
(31) Ibid p.318 
(32) Coote April 1973 5 NZULR p.292 
* Refer also to pages 52-55 
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The descriptive terms have been attached to the 
deposit in an attempt to explain the unique qualities it 
possesses when it is performing its role in relation to the 
contract law of sale and purchase of land. Judicial decisions 
vary as to what the views are to such doctrines of rescission. 
Ultimately however, they are guided by policy considerations 
as to what they consider to be fair or equitable in the 
circumstances. This is clearly borne out in the context of 
recoverability of unpaid deposits where conflicting case law 
still persists. 
The deposit generally takes the form of a monetary pay-
ment though the parties may agree upon another form of pay-
ment as a substitute. A deposit must however be distinguished 
from a part payment. A deposit is a sum of money paid as 
''a guarantee that the contract shall be performed11 .< 33 ) It 
is irrecoverable if the purchaser defaults< 34) unless the 
contract otherwi s e provides.< 35 ) A part payment is simply 
payment of part of the purchase price and it is recoverable( 3G) 
even if the sale goes off by virtue of the purchaser's 
default( 3?) unless an express provision in the contract is 
stated to be contrary. The converse applies however where 
instalments, although not termed as a deposit in the contra ct, 
are called and treated as such. In the case of Chard v. 
Wille{38 ) it was held that where the purchasor instead of 
paying the agreed deposit in cash at the date of the sale 
paid it by instalments, subsequent to the contract. The 
subsequent payments did not lose their character of a deposit 
by reason merely of being paid at a later date. It follows 
(33) Home v. Smith (1884) 27 Ch.D. 89 at p.45 
( 34) Supra 
(35) Palmer v. Temple (1839) 9 A & E 508 
(36) Mayson v. Clouet (1924J A.C. 890 
(37) Harrison v. Holland & Hannan & Another (1922) 1 KB 211 
Margetts v. Khan (1915) 11 Tas. L.R.147 
(38) (1933) QSR 182 21 Aust'n. Digest 854 
H. 
.... 
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from -this that the deposit need not be paid on the signing 
of the contract. 
The amount of money usually paid by way of deposit in 
a sale or auction or by private treaty is ten per cent of 
the purchase price. There is however no general rule or 
custom as to how much shall be paid. The parties can 
arrange and agree upon an appropriate amount following 
consideration of such matters as the state of the property, 
the purchaser's financial capacity at that given time and 
the condition of the property market. 
The Amount of the Deposit. 
The amount of money demanded and paid as a deposit has 
raised the issue as to whether a substantial sum fixed can be 
looked upon as a penal sum the forfeiture of which equity will 
grant relief. Discussion on this point raises larger implic-
ations as to whether the deposit upon forfeiture may be regard-
ed generally as a penalty or as liquidated damages. 
The Supreme Court of Western Australia in Coates v. Sarich< 39 ) 
formulated a clear line of analysis to undertake when asking if 
a deposit of a large sum is really a penalty. "If the deposit 
is surprisingly large and if there is no express forfeiture 
clause the question may arise as a matter of interpretation 
whether the parties when using the word 'deposit' mean that the 
payment in question was in truth to have the normal incidence 
of 
of a deposit or whether it was merely an error;nomenclature. 
Secondly, if that question is answered that there was no error 
of expression, or if there is an express forfeiture clause, the 
(39) [1964] W.A.R. 2 
* Refer also to pages 38-40 
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question may still arise whether what the parties have con-
tracted for is in truth a penalty and in the later context the 
question whether the sum is a true deposit becomes the question 
whether it is a reasonable deposit or whether it was so unreason-
able a sum to be forfeited that it should be treated as a 
penalty against which relief should be granted11 .< 4o) 
The question as to whether a stipulated sum by way of 
deposit is reasonable must depend on the circurnstancesof each 
case for a proportionately larger deposit may be very reasonable 
whether the subject matter of the sale is a wasting asset which 
may be quickly worked out; or whether it is a business which by 
mismanagement could be seriously prejudiced in a short ,time. ( 41 ) 
So too in Stockloser v. Johnson< 42 ) Denning LJ. said "again 
suppose that a vendor of property in lieu of the usual ten per 
cent deposit stipulates for an initial payment of fifty per cent 
of the price as a deposit and a part payment11 ••••• 11 and when the 
, purchaser fails to complete and the vendor sells the property 
at a profit and in addition claims to forfeit the fifty per cent 
surely the court will relieve against the forfeiture. The 
vendor cannot forestall this equity by describing an extravagant 
sum as a deposit, anymore than he can recover a penalty by 
calling it liquidated damages 11 <43 ) and later on "It must be 
unconscionable for the seller to retain the money11 <44 ) 
How then is the genuine pre-estimate of damage to be cal-
culated? Each case will vary as to circumstantial evidence, 
such as what percentage the deposit bears to the purchase price, 
the delicate nature of the property as perhaps being susceptible 
to mismanagement, or deterioration which would put the business 
( 4 0) Coates v. Saric h ( 1 9 6 4J W. A . R • 2 p . 1 5 
(41) re Hoobin deceased [1951) V.R. 341 
(42) (1954) 1 QB.476 
(43) Ibid p.491-2 
(44) Ibid p.490 
* Refer also to pages 38-40 
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in jeopardy. <45 ) 
I. Payment by Cheque. 
An auctioneer has authority to receive payment by cheque< 46 ) 
but he cannot be compelled to do so.< 47 ) The Court of Appeal 
decision in Pollway v. Abdullah( 4B) raised another question in 
regard to deposits paid in connection with sale of land. The 
vendor put the sale of their land in the hands of auctioneers. 
The land was knocked down to the defendant who signed a memo-
randum with the auctioneers - as agents for the vendors. The 
.. 
condition of sale provided for the payment of the deposit. The 
purchaser made out a cheque for the deposit to the auctioneers, 
which was later dishonoured. The purchaser refused to compete 
so the land was resold by the vendors, who then joined force 
with the auctioneers and sued the purchaser for the cheque. 
Roskill J. found that there was a separate contract between 
the auctioneers and the purchaser "independent from that between 
the vendors and the purchaser 11 <49 ). 
The considera tion for this contract was that at the moment 
when the cheque wa s given and received by the auctioneers they 
warranted t o the defendant (purcha ser) their authority to sign 
the memorandum on the vendor's behalf and to receive the cheque 
payable to themselves as named payees in diminution of the 
defendant's obligation to pay the full amount of the purchase 
price to the vendors. 
The vendor's claim was disallowed, on the grounds that they 
were never holders of the cheque and so consequently could not 
(45) Per etual Executors and Trus tees Associa tion of Australia 
Ltd. v. Hoobin 1957 V.R. p,341 ... was held that the 
delica te na ture of the hote l business negated any issue of 
the de posit of 15,000 pounds being in the nature of a pen-
alty. 
Smyth v. Jessep ( 1956) VLR 230 p~r l1T onahan NJ. held that a 
deposit of 40 percent was p~nal in nature. 
(46) Farrer v. Lacy Hartland (15U5) 31 Ch.D. 42 
(47) Johnson v. Boyes (1889) 2 Ch. 73 
(48)(1974) 2 All ER. 381 
(49) Ibid p.384 b. 
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sue on it .. C 50) 
This decision has been criticised by A.A.S. zucherman(5 1) 
who stated "It is difficult to see how the auctioneer's warranty 
of authority can be regarded as consideration for the cheque, 
for the warranty comes into effect before the purchaser's 
obligation to pay the deposit arises".C 52 ) Nor can the con-
clusion that the cheque was given in consideration for the 
warranty to accept it be feasible since such a distinction is 
too artificial in form. 
Zuckermann stated the claim for vendors and auctioneers 
should stand and fall together, despite the fact that the 
vendors could not be regarded as holders of the cheque in the 
sense given by sections 2 and 73 of the Bill of Exchange Act 
1882. The auctioneers received the deposit as agents of the 
vendor( 53 ) and therefore one might argue "that the vendors 
could sue on the cheque in the name of the auctioneers.C 54) 
The real issue then would become whether the vendors were 
entitled to forfeit the unpaid deposit, or sue on the deposit 
after having rescinded t he contract (they were t aken to 
rescind the contract after having resold the land). Zucher-
mann refers to the position regarding a vendor's claim of the 
recoverability of unpaid deposits. Following Lowe v. Hope( 55 ) 
"the vendor cannot rescind the contrac t and insist on its per-
formance in relation to the deposit". Zuchermann however dis-
tinguished that case holdinc tha t different considerations 
should be taken in regard to deposits paid by cheque. If the 
Lowe v. Hope( 56 ) principle was enforced then "people would be 
(50) (1974) 2 All ER p.381 at p.383 
(51) MLR vol.38 p.349 May 1975 
(52) Ibid p.351 
(53) (1974) 2 All ER p.381 at p.383 b. 
(54) MLR vol.38 p.352 
(55) (1969) 3 All ER 605 per Pennycuik J. at p.608 
(56) Supra 
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reluctant to accept cheques in lieu of cash.< 57 ) Zuchermann 
thereby conclud~d Polloway v. Abdullah( 5B) was rightly decided 
on wrong reasoning, · and that to hold "the vendors had a good 
claim on the cheque, and that for this reason the auctioneers 
rightly succeeded being the vendors' agents" was the correct 
interpretation of the decision. 
This construction of distinctions from stated principles 
begs attention to two separate considerations. Whether such 
policy grounds are acceptable to warrant the distinction and 
whether the general principle of forfeiture of deposits should 
not also be the subject of critical inquiry. 
The time as to when deposit is paid may also be an import-
ant consideration. In a sale by auction once the auctioneers 
hammer has fallen the purchaser shall pay a deposit to the 
auctioneers or to the vendors' solicitors.< 59 ) 
In sale by private treaty the parties negotiate as to the 
time for payment. Usually it is when the contract is being 
signed or straight afterwards. 
As to when a deposit is paid in a 'subject to contract' 
situation the procedure may be as follows: "When an offer 
acceptable to the seller is obtained, the prospective buyer 
will be told that his offer has been accepted and he is likely 
to be asked to pay the agent in normal cases, of not more than 
ten percent of the purchase price. Either in the receipt for 
this deposit or in some other way it will be stated that the 
agreement reached is 'subject to contract' so as to make it 
clear that it is not legally binding but is subject to a formal 
contract being drawn up and signed.( 60) 
(57) MLR vol.38 p.353 ref. Hinton v. Sparkes (1 968 ) L.R. 3 CP. 
supports the view tha t a vendor can sue on an IOU. 
(58) (1974) 2 All ..ER 381. Law of-
(59) Stoneham - ; Vendor and Purchaser at p.348. 1964 edition 
(60) The UK Law Commission . Working paper No.51. 'Transfer of 
land subject to contract agreements' 3 July 1973 . 
- 22 -
II. PAYMENT TO WHOM AND THE CONSEQUENCES THAT FOLLOW. 
To whom a deposit has been paid may vary according to the 
outcome of negotiations entered into by the parties. If the 
purchaser has been introduced to the vendor via a real estate 
agency commissioned for that purpose, then the deposit is 
normally paid to the agent whom they have dealt with. In a 
sale by auction, the deposit is invariably paid to the auctioneer, 
who holds the station of a stakeholder. If negotiations have 
be~n directly made with the vendor, without the presence of an 
intermediary, then the deposit may be given to the vendor's 
solicitors. Whether such persons hold the position as either 
stakeholders or sole agents of the vendor is entirely dependent 
on the circumstances and the intentions of the parties involved. 
Such distinctions may be crucial when the issue of repayment is 
raised the condition of dishonesty or insolvency has been proved 
in the party into whose hands the deposit has been entrusted. 
So too, the relevance of such title may vary according to the 
contractual nature the negotiations have reached . 
A. Payment to Stakeholder. 
It is preferable to pay a deposit into the hands of a 
stakeholder since he receives it on behalf of both parties 
and cannot part with it without the consent of both. It is 
known that it is his duty to keep it in his own hands until 
called upon to part with it.< 61 ) In the event of premature 
payment to a party not entitled to it he is liable to account 
for it to the party intended to receive it.<
62 ) If the contract 
is completed, it is his duty to pay it to the vendor. If no 
completed contract results, he must return it to the purchaser, 
unless of course, the sale has gone off due to the default of 
(61) Harrington v. Hoggart (1830) 1 A.B. and A.D. 577 
(62) Burrough v. Skinner (1770) 5 Bur. 2638, 
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the purchaser. In that event, under the terms of the contract 
express or implied .the deposit is to be forfeited to the vendor. 
The duties of an estate agent or auctioneer in respect of 
the deposit are those of a stakeholder, in the absence of any 
express provision to the contrary( 63). 
An issue which has bided the courts' attention with respect 
to stakeholding is upon whom does the loss fall if the stake-
holder has become insolvent or has absconded with the deposit. 
The position as to liability for loss occasiioned is clear in 
~ 
regard to circwnstances when a binding contract· of sale has been 
concluded. Since the nineteenth century( 64 ) the courts have 
imposed liability for loss of the deposit on the vendor; as 
Sir Thomas Plumer V.C. stated in the case of Annesley v. Mugg-
ridge(65) "for though the auctioneer is to a certain degree 
stakeholder for vendor and vendee yet so far as respects any 
risk to the deposi t, the auctioneer is considered as the agent 
only of the vendor". This statement was relied on and applied 
in Rowe v. May( 66 ) by Sir John Romilly M.R. The reasons why 
the vendor in the post contractual situation is deemed liable to 
bear the loss appear to be that (1) "the vendor chooses the 
person to whom the deposit is paid, (2) the deposit is intended 
by both parties to form part of the purchase price of the 
property, which has become payable under the terms of the con-
tract. It should a lso be noted that the purchaser is normally 
bound by his contract with the vendor to pay the deposit to the 
stakeholder. 11 ( 67 ) 
What is the position however when the deposit is paid 
before any binding contract has been concluded? Before the 
( 63) 
( 64) 
( 65) 
. ( 66) 
( 67 ) 
0 
Edgell v. Day (1 865 ) L.R. K.P. at p.~4 ref. to an auctioneer~ 
Brodard v. Pilkington unreported April 20 1953. Note (1971) ~ 
2 QB 422 as to an estate agent. 
Fenton v. Browne (1 807 ) 14 vess 144 p .150 per Sir William 
Grant, Smith v. Jackson (1 816) 1 Madd 618 at 620 per Sir 
Thomas Plwner V.C. 
(1816) 1 Madd .593 although obiter . Sugden on Vendor and 
Purchaser 14 ed.(1862) at p.52 'a loss by the insolvency of 
the auctioneer will, in every case, fall on the vendor who 
nominates him and whose agent he properly is'. 
(1 854) 18 Bev . 613 at p.616 . 
The conveyancer vol.22 'the loss of the deposit' by 
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recent House of Lords decision of Sorrell v. Finch( 68 ) there 
appeared to be no direct authority on this issue. The only 
case that appeared to throw any light on this problem was 
Chillingworth v. Esche( 69 ) where it was held that the deposit 
was returnable as no binding contract existed. The purchaser, 
in the view of Warrington L.J. has merely shown he had meant 
business. "He had not bound himself but in order to show a 
definite intention, he was willing to part with money and run 
the risk of the vendor spending the money and being unable to 
return it if negotiation was broke; off."( 7o) 
If this was the nature of the deposit then it was submit-
ted the risk of the loss of the deposit should be borne by the 
purchaser, for the deposit could not be treated as belonging to 
the vendor. ( 71 ) 
In Sorrell v. Finch <72 ) the House of Lords unanimously 
decided that where an estate agent receives a deposit from the 
prospective purchaser - in' a subject to contract situation and 
fails to repay it - he alone is liable. The purchaser has an 
I 
action against the estate agent only subject to the qualification 
that the estate agent had not been expressly authorised to take 
it. 
It would appear from that decision that following an un-
successful action by the purchaser against the agent he must 
sustain the loss of his deposjt. 
The use of the term pre-contractual stakeholder has however 
been the subject of criticisrn.< 73 ) Lord Edmund Davies in 
Maloney v. Hardy and Moorshead expressed doubts as to the 
( 68) 
( 69) 
(70) 
( 71) 
( 72) 
( 73) 
( 1976) 2 WLR 833 
(1924) 1 Ch.97 
Ibid p.112 
The Conveyancer Vol.22 p.261 
(1976) 2 All ER p.371 
LQR Vol.92 Oct.1976. F.M.B. Reynolds. Potters (a firm v. 
Loppert (1973} 1 All ER 658 at p.668. Maloney v. Hardy and 
Moorshead (1971) 2 All ER 630, 
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applicability of such a phrase for "the essence of stakeholding 
in vendor and purchaser cases is that a binding contract of sale 
has been entered into and the intending purchaser deposits with 
a third party a sum to be held pending completion; meanwhile the 
third party holding the deposit may part with it to neither con-
tracting party without the consent of the other." In negotiations 
made and deposits paid subject to contract the purchaser can 
demand the return of the deposit at any stage and none can law-
fully gainsay him. The true definition of stakeholding would 
~ 
therefore appear to have no application to situations such as 
that. 
However to draw such a distinction would appear to be just 
an exercise in semantics. So long as the pre-contractual 
stakeholder and pos t-contractual stakeholders duties remain 
conceptually distinct no problem should arise. The initial 
confusion of the term stakeholder may account for one of the 
' reasons why vendors were held liable for the loss of a deposit 
occasioned by a real estate agent's dishonesty.C 74 ) 
However, following Sorrell v. FinchC 75 ), vendors are no 
longer liable unless estate agents are duly authorised by them 
to receive a deposit on their behalf. The position of a pre-
contractual stakeholder may be summarised as follows: "The 
receiver of a pre-contractual deposit holds for the depositor 
alone, not only may he not pay the money to the prospective 
vendor unless authorised by the depositor , he must also repay 
the deposit to the purchaser on demand. His position is more 
like that of a stakeholder in a wagering contract - see Hampden 
v. Walsh.C 76 ) 
( 74) As held in Ryan v. Pilkington (1 959 ) 1 All ER 689. Burt v. 
Claude Cousins and Another (1971) 2 All ER 611. If the Rowe 
v. May (1854) 18 Beav 613 principle held to apply , then the 
vendor would be liable for the loss . 
(75) (1976) 2 All ER 371. 
(76) (1878) 1 QB 189 . ref. LQR Vol. 92 . Oct.1976 p.486. 
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When examined in practical terms, the objection raised 
against supplying ~he terms of stakeholder in the pre-contractual 
context must be discounted. This is illustrated by Pennycuick VC. 
in the case of Potters (a firm) v. Loppert( 77) who was aware of 
the doubts expressed as to its accuracy and yet applied the term 
himself "I appreciate the force of that criticism but the term 
is used by estate agents themselves and so long as one appreciates 
the distinction between the duties of the depositee in relation 
to a pre-contractual deposit and those in relation to a contract .. 
deposit, I think the term may be used as a convenient label. It 
is difficult to think of a better one 11 .< 7
8 ) 
_B_. __ The position as regards interest accumulated on the deposit. 
Following from the decision in Potters (a firm) v. Loppert(
79 ) 
a stakeholder with regard to a pre-contractual or post-contractual 
deposit is entitled to retain interest moneys accrued on it. 
Pennycuick V.C. stated that "It is to my mind conclusive apart 
from agreement to the contrary, a contract deposit paid to a 
stakeholder is not paid to him as trustee but on a contractual 
or quasi-contrac tual liability with the consequences that the 
stakeholder is not accountable for the profit on it".(SO) The 
reason why this is so is based on the policy consideration ex-
pressed by Lord Tenterden C.J. in Harington v. Hoggart<
81 ) "If 
he think fit to employ it and make interest on it my l aying it 
out in the funds or otherwise, and any loss accrue he must be 
answerable for that loss, and if he is to answer .fo:v the loss 
it seems to me has a right to any immediate advantage that may 
(77) (1 973) 1 All ER p . 658 , 
(78) Ibid p.668. 
(79) Ibid 
(80) Ibid p.662 
(81) (1830) 1 Band AD 577 at 586 587, 
arise". Pennycuick V.C. then extended this right to interest 
to pre-contractual deposits. He stated after analysing the duties 
of a pre-contractual and post-contractual stakeholder "however 
one analyses the obligations of a stakeholder it seems to me 
that a stakeholder's capacity must remain constant throughout".( 82 ) 
He refused to uphold the contention that in relation to a pre-
contractual deposit, the depositor holds it as trustee and would 
therefore "be accountable for profit derived from the Trust 
property including income profit from its investment11 .C 83 ) He 
... 
based his claim for the nonaccountability of interest by the 
stakeholder following statements made in Barington v. Lee that 
"a claim for the return of the deposit lies in contract11 .C 84) 
If the claim therefore sounds in the common law count for money 
had and received whether in contract or quasi-contract no claim 
can be pleaded in trust. 
Criticism has been aroused against this decision.( 85 ) 
Firstly as to the proposition put forward "that the s'takeholder' s 
capacity must remain cons t ant throuehout - viz. from the pre-
contractu2.l to the post-contractual stage". The recent decision 
of Sorrell v. Finch ( 86 ) indicates the two stages are jurid-
ically different. The form of obligations and duties undertaken 
by the stakeholder in the two situations cause a variance in his 
capacity, and must remain conceptually distinct so that the 
confused decisions as to the liability of vendors for dishonest 
estate agents' actions do not arise again. 
A second ground of criticism was launched by R.M. Goode( 87 ) 
who stated Pennycuick V.C.'s statements were erroneous in two 
respects. First in assuming t hat the defendant who is account-
able for the corpus of a fund is entitled in principal to retain 
(82) (1973) 1 All ER 658 at p.668(h) per Pennycuick V.C. 
(83) Ibid p.661 
(84) (1971) 3 All ER 1231 at p.1238 per Denning M.R. 
(85) LQR Vol.92 October 1976 p.486-87. 
(86) (1976) 2 All ER p.371 
(87) LQR Vol.92 July 1976 p.371. 
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interest and secondly in denying the status of a trustee to the 
estate agent, "there _can be little doubt that an estate agent 
owes a duty to keep . money deposited with him separate from his 
own moneys and is thus a trustee for the purchaser before the 
to 
exchange of contracts and thereafter on trust/pay the vendor on 
completion, or if the contract is discharged without completion 
taking place, to return it to the purchaser. The reason why an 
estate agent was entitled to the accrued interest was not because 
he is not a trustee, nor because the plaintiff in an action for 
money had and received is in principle only entitled to receive 
the corpus of the fund, but because it was an implied term 
established by usage that an e s t ate agent can retain the interest 
as a reward for his duties as stakeholder11 .( 88 ) This latter con-
sideration was al so envoked by Pennycuick V.C., "the interest 
not merely represents a reward for the agent's trouble, but also 
a recompense for the sterilisation of the property vis a vis the 
estate agent during the period between the payment of the deposit 
and the conclusion of a contract or its breakdown with the con-
sequence tha t the agent has no prospect of earning a commission 
on its sale to any other party so long as the property remains 
sterilised".( 89 ) Perhaps the Judge would have been better 
advised to direct his mind to t his principle of common usage than 
to have indulged in an analysis tha t called for criticism. It 
may be however that the above comments lack substance. This 
would be so if the practice was adopted that, "the property 
would probably be left on the market now11 .C 9o) This would enable 
estate agents the chance of becoming aware of other interested 
parties. The statement as to a reward for his trouble also 
(88) 
(89) 
(90) 
LQR Vol.92 July 1976 p.371 footnote 44. 
Potters ( a firm) v. Loppert 1973 1 All ER 658 at p.669. 
The UK Law Commission working paper No.51 Transfer of land 
subject to contract agreements . 3 July 1973, 
.... 
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requires c.onsideration. The agent will secure a commission 
only on the terms of his assignment. He may only be entitled 
to a payment once the contract is completed. It is difficult 
to see therefore why he should be recompensed for this trouble. 
For the vulnerability of his employment i s only balanced by t he 
standard of efficiency he displays as a s alesman. 
F.M.B. Reynolds( 91 ) also suggested prior to Potter's( 92 ) 
ca s e , t hat if a stakeholder could be regarded as a trustee and 
so accountable for interest obtained on pre-contractual deposits, 
~ 
such payments may not be so readily asked for. Such possibilities 
however will not effect the di shonest estate agent. For such 
pers ons will assure against any possibilities arising where they 
have to account for the corpus, let alone the interest. 
C. Payment to the vendor, solicitor , or agent: 
A de posit pai d to a vendor's s olicitor or agent is received 
by him as agent for the vendpr unle s s the contrary is stated.( 93 ) 
In such a case the de posit is de emed to be pa id into the hands 
of the vendor himself, in accordance with the gener al rul e of 
agency that payment to an agent is equivalent to payment to his 
principal. As a r esult of t his when the purchaser bec omes 
entitled to the return of his money, it is the vendor from whom 
it is rec overable, whether or not it has actually been paid over 
to hi m.< 94 ) Following on from this the purchaser cannot sue 
the ae;ent when the de posit i s s ti l l in hi s possession.< 95 ) "An 
agent is bound to a cc ount for hi s pri ncipal for any profi t which 
he make s as a r esult of hi s ae;ency11 <96 ) as wa s held by Lord 
Tent erden C.J. i n Haringt on v. Hoggar t "if an agent receives 
money for his principal t he very instant he receives it it 
bec omes the money of his pri ncipal, If instead of paying it 
( 91) "Estat e agent s and deposits again LQR Vol . 88 J uly 1972 184 
a t o .1 89 . 
( 92 ) ~ 973]1 All ER 658. 
( 93) Edgell v. Day (1 865)1 LR 1 CP 80 at 85. 
(94) Norfolk v. Worthy~80~1 Camp 337. 
( 95) 12ramford v. Shuttleworth ~ 8AQ) 11 AD and EL 926 
( 96) Hippi s ley v Knee, Brother s [1905] 1 KB . 
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over to his principal he thinks to retain it and makes a profit 
he may in such circumstances be liable to account for the 
profi t 11 • ( 97 ) 
D. Estate Agent: 
An estate agent who receives a deposit may either be a 
stakeholder or agent of the vendor in contracts for the sale 
and purchase of land. Estate agents are normally employed by 
vendors to find prospective purchasers. They may however be 
employed by intending purchasers looking for suitable real 
estate. 
Estate agents have been subject of contentious litigation 
in the English courts for thirty to fifty years. The question 
that has troubled them for so long has been, on whom should lia-
bility be placed if an estate agent decamps with a deposit or 
loses it due to insolvency. Until the deci sion of Sorrell v. 
Finch( 98 ) a vendor who employed an estate agent was held liable 
to account to the purchaser for the lost deposit from the agent's 
improper conduct. The first case that decided this point was 
Ryan v. Pilkington.< 99 ) There an estate agent was instructed 
to find a purchaser . Upon doing so he obt ained two separate 
swns of a hundred pounds each as de posit signing the receipts 
respectively as agent for the vendor and simply as agent. No 
concluded contract was entered irito and the purchaser sued the 
vendor for the deposit upon evidence of the agent's insolvency. 
The Court of Appeal held the purchaser was entitled to obtain 
the deposit from the vendor even though he had not in fact 
received it. They held the principle to be applicable was that 
( 97) ( 18.30) 1 B and AD 577, at 586. 
(98) (1976) 2 All ER p.371. 
( 9 9) ( 1 9 5 9) 1 WLR 4 0 3 . 
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stated in Bowstead on Agency.( 100) "Every act done by an agent 
in the cou~se of his employment on behalf of the principal and 
within the apparent scope of his authority binds the principal. 
The Judges described the estate agent's authority as both 
implied and ostensible. The judgements of Morris and Willmer 
L.J.J. were mainly concerned withihe taking of the deposit as 
something 'reasonably incidenta1 1 <101 ) to the estate agents 
express instructions to find a purchaser - that is to say the 
decision was one of implied authority.< 102) 
This was the decided view ~taken of the case by the Court 
of Appeal in Burt v. Claude Cousins and Company Limited. (103) 
There they decided that where a deposit is paid to an estate 
agent in a subject to contract situation,he received it whether 
or not he could be described as a stakeholder, as agent for the 
prospective vendor , so that the vendor was liable if no sale 
subsequently occurred and the estate agent defaulted. 
There the c our t reiterated the two types of authority as 
both implied and ostensible( 104)(stemming from his being held 
out by the vendor as being entitled to ac t in that capacity), 
although the decision was founded on t he basis of implied 
authori t y (vi s a vis the principal/vendor there was an i mplied 
authori ty to take the deposit as it accorded with general 
prac tice). 
The next case that ajudicated on this issue was Barington v. 
Lee .< 105 ) In that case the estate agent expressly received the 
deposit as stakeholder and decamped with it. Lord Denning re-
iterated the dissent he had expressed in Burke v. Claude Cousins 
and Company( 106) that the vendor should not be liable, and also 
( 100) 
( 101) 
(102) 
( 103) 
( 104) 
( 105 ) 
( 106) 
10th edition para.82 and cited in Navarrov.Moregrand Ltd. 
1951 WN 335 at p.336. 
Ryan and Pilkington 1959 1 All ER 689 at p .695 697. 
'The Lost Deposit' The Conveyancer Vol.36 5 at.p .1 0 . 
(1 972 ) 2 All ER 611 following Sachs J. and Goding v. 
Fraser 1967 1 ¼~R 286. 
Although in the former cases the two epithe~s were used 
as if synonymously applicable to the same kind of author-
ity ref. p.619c 621a,b. 
( 1971) 3 WLR 962 . 
(1 972 ) 2 All ER 611. 
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suggested that the court was not bound to and should not follow 
that case. Lord Edmund Davies L.J. although sympathetic to the 
views expressed by Lord Denning decided with Stephenson L.J. 
that they were bound by that case. The three Judges distinguished 
Burt v. Claude Cousins and Company on the rather unsatisfactory 
grounds that in their case the purchaser had obtained a judge-
ment although an unsatisfied one against the estate agent and 
so was barred from bringing an action against the vendor. 
The House of Lords in Sorrell v. Finch( 167) however, 
.. reversed these decisions, and decided unanimously that an estate 
agent who receives a deposit in a subject to contract situation 
and fails to repay it, he alone is liable in the absence of 
other indications that he is authorised by the vendor to accept 
the money . The vendor is no longer liable for the loss of the 
deposit by his mere engagement of the offending estate agent. 
Lord Denning's dissenting views were given voice too. Lord 
Edmund Davies stated tha t the purchaser can demand the deposit 
returned at any stage and simultaneously the vendor has not 
control over it; 11 in this alleged relationship of agency the 
vendor has no control over the property alleged to have been 
received on his behalf which makes it so unlikely and so wide a 
departure from ordinary law as to be unacceptable 11 .< 1oB) 
The earlier cases were greatly influenced by the prejudice 
to the potential purchaser if he could not sue the prospective 
vendor. This is most clearly expressed in Burt v. Claude 
Cousins and Company Limited( 1o9) where Sachs L.J. quoted the 
dictum of Holt c.J. "for seeing somebody must be a loser by this 
( 107) 
( 108) 
( 109) 
(1976) 2 All ER 371 
Ibid at p.380 d-e 
(1971) 2 All ER 611 
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by this deceit, it is more reasonable that he that employs and 
puts a trust and confidence in the deceiver should be a loser 
rather than a stranger. (Hern v. Nichols 1701, 1 Salk 288)tt. 
But the House of Lords took a different view of the matter. 
Lord Edmund Davies stated, "while one must naturally have 
sympathy with the purchaser such intuitions of justice as I 
possess do not command that he should be recouped by a vendor 
who shares his innocence and differs from him only in engaging 
someone to find a purchaser for his house." 
F.M. Reynolds commented on this case, "a'l.though the 
decision was described by a correspondent in the Times as 
'elegant as law but diabolical as justice' it is submitted that 
it is to be welcomed as recognising the true position of the 
receiver of a pre-contractual deposit. 11 ( 110) It is submitted 
that the observation made by the correspondent is dependent on 
one's conception of justice. Although it is recognised that in 
most circwnstances if an estate agent decamps with a deposit he 
will ensure he will not be in a position to account for it . 
The other situation as to his insolvency guarantees the purch-
aser has lost his money. 
The question that arises following Sorrell v. Finch( 111 ) 
is when is a vendor liable for estate agents' dishonest actions? 
Lord Edmund Davies suggests the vendor is liable when the agent 
has an express or implied authority to receive the deposit on 
his behalf. He however provides no indication as to what form 
,J ) 
such authority will take, except that a prospective vendor's 
knowledge that a deposit has been received does not impose 
(110) LQR Vol.92 Oct 1976 p.486. 
(111) (1976) 2 All ER 371. 
.... 
- 34 -
liability ·on him to repay it.< 112) The only comments that may 
be of assistance in attempting to define the scope of these terms 
were those made in relation to the case of Ryan v. Pilkington( 11 3). 
Lord Edmund Davies stated that due to the uncontradicted evid-
ence of the estate agent's express authority to receive a deposit 
it would have been impossible to exculpate the vendor from liab-
ility in that case. Such evidence referred to was as follows; 
The vendor never denied giving the estate agent authority to 
receive the deposit on his behalf, nor did he challenge the 
agent's authority when the pros pective purchaser first informed 
him that the deposit had been paid. If these circumstances are 
indicative of the class of cases in which liability will be 
imposed on a vendor then a purchaser would be ill advised to 
submit a pre-contractual deposit unless he has been notified of 
the agent's express authorisation. So too, Lord Russell of 
Killowen offered no enlightening as s istance to this question. 
He held that in the present case there was no implied or ostens -
ible authority imparted. He also sta ted tha t, "when an e s tate 
agent offers no description as to hi s capacity or t er ms hims elf 
a stakeholder and then defaults, the vendor is not l i able to 
account to the purchaser 11 .< 114 ) It is suggested following thi s 
decision that unless express authority repre s enting a conference 
of power by the vendor is given, no vendor will be liable. The 
view as to what represents implied authority may refer to tha t 
expressed in Burt v. Claude Cousins~ 115 ) It is comm on practice 
and established usage for estate agents to accept pre-contractua l 
deposits on the vendor's behalf - and that the t aki ng of the 
( 112) 
( 113) 
( 114) 
( 11 5) 
( 1976) 
( 1959) 
(1976) 
(1971) 
371 
2 All ER/at p.3 81 
1 WLR 403 
2 All ER 371 at p.384(c) 
2 QB 426 
..... 
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deposit is reasonably or ordinarily incidental to the agent's 
task of promoting a contract with a prospective purchaser.< 116 ) 
If the above two factors are approved then the authority is 
deemed to have been given. It would appear however that such 
considerations may not be sufficient to impose liability 
following Sorrell v. Finch. Indications as to the capacity of 
the estate agent and the rights each party has claimed with 
respect to the deposit money will operate as guidelines for the 
court to follow. 
What rights does the purchaser possess if the estate agent 
collects the money without prior express authorisation? Sachs J. 
in Burt v. Claude Cousins stated, "a claim manifestly does lie 
against the estate agent, whatever the answer to the question 
of status or capacity, i.e. as either trustee or stakeholder.< 117 ) 
Lord Denning in Barington v. Lee held, "that a purchaser can sue 
an estate agent had and received based on an imputed promise to 
pay, 11 <118) F.M.B. Reynolds suggests the above statement employs 
the terminology of quasi contract "the action against the agent 
is a subject to contract situation is surely quasi contractual 
or even equitable and is based on the fact that it is he who 
holds the money for the use of the purchaser or even that the 
money still belongs to the purchaser in equity. 11 <119) 
It would appear that an action manifestly lies against an 
e d ( 1 2 0) · f th t · · 1 ae;ent by a wrong ;purchaser. However 1 e agen is 1nso v-
ent then the purchaser has no recourse and as Edmund Davies 
stated "one must naturally have sympathy with him11 .< 121 ) The 
only advice tendered for a prospective purchaser is that "he 
(116) 1ILR Vol.33 July 1972 notes p.419 
(117) (1971) 2 All ER 611 at p.622(a) 
(118) (1971) 3 All ER 1237 at 1238 
(119) "Estate Aeents and Deposits Again" LQR Vol.88 184 at p.188 
(120) The real estate institute headquarters in Auckland controls 
a fidelity fund, so that a deposit will be repaid to a pur-
chaser following an estate agent's dishonest actions after 
a thorough investigation has been entered into. This fund 
does not extend to loss occasioned by an agency's insolvency. 
(121) Sorrell v. Finch (1976) 2 All ER 371 at p.380(a) · 
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should refrain from paying a deposit until he is sure that it 
is required by the vendor himself, if he allows himself to be 
coerced by suggestions on the part of the estate agent that 
there is competition to purchase the property he has only himself 
to blame". ( 122) 
E. The need for reformative measures: 
A lot of the confusion in this area has arisen as a con-
sequence of the use of the term 'estate agent'. It was assumed 
that any person bearing that title who performed services with 
regard to the vendor's property was to be attributed the status 
of agent of the vendor. As Lord Edmund Davies stated"such con-
fusion may never have arisen if the intermediary had been termed 
a realtor~( 123 ) The term real estate agent is however a phrase 
c oined by those persons undertaking such employment and is under-
stood by the public generally. To evidence a change would result 
in substantial inconvenience that could not be justified. 
F.M.B. Reynolds suggests a favourable solution to this 
problem, "at the very least the relevant professional association 
should prepare a standard form of memorandum of deposit making 
it clear what the agent is purporting to do. This would make 
the task of legal interpretation simpler and once the intended 
position on the agent's side was made more obvious the question 
of the value of the practice would be open to public scrutiny11 .< 124) 
The vendor could by such a form represent that the estate 
agent was acting expressly on his behalf coveting an awareness 
that should the agent default he is personally l i able. So too, 
purchasers would lend ereater consideration to the payment of 
pre-contractual deposits, being aware of their vulnerable pos-
itions in the event of estate agents acting without the sanction 
(122) 
( 123) 
(124) 
'The Lost Deposit' Vol .36 The Conveyancer, J.R. :Murdoch 
Sorrell v. Finch (1 976 ) 2 All ER 371 at p.381(a) 
LQR Vol .88 April 1972 185 at p .189. 
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of prior authorisation. 
III. FORFEITURE OF. THE DEPOSIT. 
The general right of forfeiture is ancilliary to the right 
to rescind the contract. If the purchaser defaults in the per-
formance of his obligations then the vendor upon rescinding the 
contract may forfeit the deposit.( 125 ) A qualification to this 
general right exists however if the contract contains an express 
intention to the contrary, such as when there is a clause that 
~tates in the event of a default a certain sum of money shall be 
forfeited.( 126 ) The court will in such a case give effect to 
the clause. 
A. Forfeiture by law and by contract: 
Why this right of forfeiture exists is because of the nature 
of the deposit and the role it plays. The deposi t is the parties' 
provision of a security for the fulfillment of the whole contract 
by the purchaser. The vendor is entitled to retain the deposit 
even if he has suffered no loss. It is well recognized by the 
authorities that in this regard, a deposit stands in an except-
ional position when a vendor rescinds a contrac t for the sale of 
land for the purchaser's breach.( 127 ) The right of forfeiture 
may be found in the express terms of the contract - such as in 
a forfeiture clause, or it arises by implication from the intent-
ion of the parties.( 128) This is because it is part of an 
earnest on the par t of the purchaser to bind the bargain and 
give some assurance that the purchaser means business. Such 
circwnstances point to the conclusion that it was within the 
( 125) 
( 126) 
( 127) 
( 128) 
Howe v. Smith (1884) 27 Ch.D.89 Collins v. Stimson (1883) 
11 QB .D. 143 
Palmer v. Temple (1 839) 2 Ad. & E .• 508 
Coates v. Sarich (1964) W.A.R.2 at p.10 (25-30) per D'Arcy 
Howe v. Smith (1884) 27 Ch.D.89 
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intention of the parties that it should become the property 
of the vendor if the purchaser defaults even if the contract 
was silent on this ·point. 
It has been said that such a right of retention is not a 
forfeiture but it is within the nature of liquidated damages.< 129) 
The courts have consistantly refused to apply to deposits the 
rules regarding penalties - and the reason for this is not 
wholly satisfactory.< 13o) Such reasons include, "because they 
often bear a reasonable proportion to the loss likely to be 
suffered ~y the vendor11 .< 131 ) The only difference Trietel 
suggests between "a guarantee that the contract shall be per-
formed and a payment of money stipulated in errorem of the 
offending party lies in the emotive force of the words used 11 .< 132) 
The courts have consistently looked upon the deposit as a 
payment of liquidated damages and for a swn to be liquidated 
damages it must be a genuine pre-estimate of damage.< 133 ) It 
has been held a deposit may be looked upon as a pre-estimate of 
damage likely to be suffered. "It is intended as a compensa t-
ory swn to cover the vendor for the many hypothetical losses 
(difficult of precise specification or assessment) 11 .< 134) Such 
losses may be quantified as follows: "if the vendor resells 
his property he will be put to some trouble and expense in dojng 
so a.nd jf he retains possession he will have lost the benefit 
of his time, trouble and expense in making the initial sale." 
A sum of five or ten percent of the purchase price has been 
held to be a genuine pre-estimate of damage. The courts have 
denied any right of inquiry in which no loss has been sustained, 
( 129) 
( 130) 
( 131) 
( 132) 
( 133) 
( 134) 
Hinton v. Sparkes (1 868) L.R. 3 C.P.1 61 
A.A.S. Zuckerman M.L.R. Vol.38 349 at p.354 
Treitel. The Law of Contract. 4th edition p.670 
Ibid 
Public Works Commissioner v. Hills (1906) AC.368 at p .375-6 
(P.C 
Coate s v. Sarich (1 964) W.A.R. 2 at p.6 per Wolff C.J. 
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and the sum paid is not penal even if justice demands their 
intervention. 
(a) Forfeiture by .Contract. 
Some judges have even refused to grant equitable relief 
against forfeiture clauses of a penal character as Raner L.J. in 
Stockloser's case stated "there is no equity •••••..• in favour 
of a purchaser who has failed to complete his contract through 
default of the vendor. For my part I share the reluctance which 
Farrell J. expressed to sponsor such an equity; it seems to me 
in the long run it is bette~ that people who freely negotiate 
and conclude a contract of sale should be held to their bargains 
rather than the judges should intervene by substituting, each 
according to his own individual sense of fairness, terms which 
are contrary to those which the parties have agreed upon them-
selves". ( 135) 
This statement was modified by the Court of Appeal in 
Starside Properties Ltd. v. Mustapha.( 136 ) Raner J. had held 
that the court had no power to order repayment of forfeited 
instalments pursuant to a contractual provision, but that a 
purchaser should be afforded advance to repay the money in 
arrears. In Starside Properties the court stated it had the 
power to extend the time allowed for repayment or provide one 
more 'chance'. This doctrine of equitable relief allows the 
court to do "what the justice of the case is seen to require" 
and so thereby introduce flexibility into the court's role. 
This case is important in that it shows that the courts will 
intervene where contractual provisions are harsh or unconscion-
( 135) 
( 136) 
Stockloser's case (1954) 1 QB 476 at p.501 
(1974) W.L.R. p.816 at p.824 per Edmund Davies L.J. 
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able and grant the relief they consider appropriate. Such dis-
plays of active participation may ultimately lead to a re-
appraisal by the courts of their former stand in regard to the 
inapplicability of the law of penalties as to deposits. It is 
unlikely however that the courts will do so, for even Lawton L.J. 
in Starside Properties voiced a warning that the process must 
not be taken too far and the court should only intervene to 
protect a clearly defined equity and should not make its decision 
by what it considers to be the length of the Chancellor's foot 
nor by taking on the role of a fussing judicial nanny seeking to 
protect the improvident from their folly by entering into dis-
advantageous contracts.( 137) 
The courts have,however,granted relief against penal pro-
visions that represent deposits when equity demands. It has 
been held "that to decide whether a sum is a penalty or liquid-
ated damages - the circumstances must be taken as a whole and 
must be viewed at the time the bargain was made 11 .( 138) The fact 
that the sum of money has been termed a deposit by the parties 
is not conclusive evidence that it is in the nature of liquid-
ated damages, although some weight must be given to the fact 
that they termed it as such. The court will look at the amount 
paid in relation to the total purchase price, the type of pro-
perty that is being sold and whether it is unconscionable for 
the vendor to retain the stipulated swn. By statute the court 
can also order repayment of a deposit paid under a contract for 
the sale of land even though the deposit is not penal.( 139 ) But 
it seems that this power is hardly even (if at all) exercised 
to allow a defaulting purchaser to recover back the usual ten 
(1974) W.L.R. 816 at p.826 
.. 
( 13 7) 
( 138) 
(139) 
Public Works Commissioner v. Hills (1906) AC.368 (P.C.) at 
p.376 
Law of Property Act 1925 S.49(2) available in the UK. 
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percent deposit.< 14o) 
If the deposit has been paid upon the signing of a prelim-
inary contract and either party refuses to enter into a binding 
contract the deposit is returnable to the purchaser without 
interest.<
141
) In Chillingworth v. Esche there was a written 
agreement to purchase land, such agreement being made 'subject 
to a proper contract being prepared and an acknowledgement of 
money paid by the purchaser as deposit and in part payment'. 
The Court of Appea1< 142 ) held that there was mere negotiation 
• and therefore either party could draw back with impunity and the 
status quo be restored. Comment was drawn in the 1924 edition 
of the Law Quarterly Review< 143 ) to the effect that such a case 
must not command universal acceptance. Doubt was therein ex-
pressed over the question of the consideration given in return 
for the payment and whether such consideration had wholly failed 
entitling the purchaser to maintain his action for money had and 
received. "If consideration was the execution of a formal con-
tract then it had failed, but if it was paid by the purchaser 
for the benefit of entering into negotiation, or if it was paid 
as a guarantee for good faith, it is difficult to see how the 
consideration had failed 11 .< 144) The writer concluded that vendors 
should expressly stipulate for the right to retain the deposit. 
Such a suggestion is untenable. The purchaser has not guarant-
eed he means business and simultaneously the vendor has not 
offered anything in exchange except to compete in negotiations -
which are within his interests to do. 
( 140) 
( 141) 
( 142) 
( 143) 
( 144) 
James Macara v. Barclays Bank Ltd . (1944) 2 All ER 31, 32 
afmd (1 945) K.B.148 
Chillingworth v. Esche (1 924) 1 Ch.97 
Following its earlier decisions in Rossdale v. Denny (1921) 
Coupe v. Ridout (1921) 1 Ch.291 1 CH.57 
p.140 per A.E.R. 
1924 LQR p .140 ref. A.E.R. 
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(b) When the right of forfeiture arises. 
The vendor may exercise his right as soon as the purchaser 
is in default.< 145 )" If time is expressed to be the essence of 
the contract then the purchaser is in default as soon as the day 
fixed for completion has passed and the purchaser has not com-
pleted the contract. However, if time is not stated to be the 
essence of the contract, the vendor can make it so by serving a 
notice on the purchaser, so long as a reasonable time for com-
pletion is given.< 146 ) 
Equity has always recognized that the parties may expressly 
contract that time is of the essence - on the other hand the law 
has recognized that the right of one party to unilaterally make 
time of the essence. The requirements to do so were laid down 
in Re Barrs contract as follows:< 147) "The vendor must be able, 
ready and willing to proceed to completion. Secondly, at the 
time when the vendor purports to make time of the essence, the 
purchaser must be guilty of such a default as to entitle the 
vendor to rescind the contract subject to its being done by a 
reasonable notice. Thirdly once the right to serve a notice of 
the kind in question has arisen the time allowed by the notice 
must be a reasonable time". As to the second requi rement, the 
position is not clear as to how long the vendor must wait before 
serving his notice. Stanley Robinson< 148) sugges ts "the nature 
o,:Othe default and its relation to the conveyancing transaction 
is relevant in determining whether there has been such default 
as to entitle the vendor to terminate the contract, subject to 
it being done by reasonable notice". The length of the notice 
(145) 
(146) 
(147) 
(148) 
Levy v. Stogden (1898 ) 1 Ch.478 
Stickney v. Keeble (1 915) AC.386 
(1956) Ch.551 at p.556 
'Making Tiwe of the Essence' Australian Law Journal 1971 
Vol.45 p.242 at p.244 
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deemed sufficient to enable the other party to perform the act 
spacified in the notice is dependant on the circumstances of 
each case. The person serving the notice must take into account 
such matters as economic circumstances and the preparation of 
instruments of transfer. 
The parties may in the United Kingdom and Australia use the 
standard conditions of sale provisions in their contract. No 
such provisions are available in New Zealand although a working 
paper was prepared in 1972( 149) following an investigation made 
as to the desirability of such conditions. 
If however the purchaser's default is due to the delay of 
the vendor there is no right of forfeiture. The vendor may if 
he is able and willing to complete, rescind and retain the 
deposit at any time if the purchaser has expressly intimated 
that he is no longer bound by the contract or unable or unwilling 
to complete.C 15o) 
(c) Recission and the availability of damages. 
Contention has arisen in the area of recission as to what 
other rights are available to the rescinding party . If damages 
are available to the innocent party who terminates the contrac t 
following the other party's breach what role does the deposit 
play? 
The English courts< 151 ) have denied the right of a rescind-
ing party to claim damages,whereas,in Australia( 152 ) and New 
Zealand( 153 ) vendors have been able to recover damages for the 
(149) 
( 150) 
( 151) 
(152) 
( 153) 
Property Law & Equity Reform Commi ttee. 
Howe v. Smith (1884 ) 27 Ch.D. 89 at p.95 
Horsler v. Zorro (1975) 2 W .L. R. 183 
McDonald v. Denny Lascelles Ltd. (1933) 
Hunt v. Hyde ( 1976) C1976] 2 .NZLR 453 
Working Paper No,2 
1 December 1972 
48 C.L.R.457 at p,47 
..... 
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loss of th~ir bargain. Such a variance of opinion may be 
explained by a historical sketch as to the remedy of recission. 
The article of Michael Albery ( 154) criticises the approach 
taken by the English courts and as perpetuated by .Mr. Williarns( 155) 
whose text is widely followed. Albery states the traditional 
view was that recission as a remedy available for the innocent 
party only extended to a right where both parties were to be 
restored (if possible) in every respect to their former positions 
with regard to the subject matter of the contract. This condition 
or equitable remedy was termed restitutio integrum. In these 
circumstances the contract is deemed never to have existed or 
has been rescinded ab initio. Such a definition of recission 
negated any claim to damages for it would involve an affirmation 
of the contract, that is hereto deemed not to exist. The only 
other remedy available for the aggrieved party was to affirm 
the contract by performing his part and claim for damages arising 
out of its breach. 
This interpretation of the term recission led to the commonly 
expressed term 'you can't rescind and claim damages'. Albery 
states however that the right to claim damages is possible if 
the innocent party treats the breach of the contract caused by 
the other party as a rep~diation of the contract. This dis-
charges him from having to perform any future obligations but 
enables him to be able to sue for damages for past breach. He 
goes on to suggest that the distinguishing features between the 
stricter and looser forrns of recission are that the former 
relates to initial invalidity in the contract whereas the latter 
relates to a breach of a serious term of the contract, 
( 154) 'Mr. Cyprian Williams' Great Heresy' 1975 91 L.Q.R. 837 
(155) Vendor & Purchaser p.1010-1011 
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Recission ab initio with its associated remedy ofrestitutio 
integrum arises when the contract contains "an inherent cause 
" 
of invalidity such as its procurement by misrepresentation or 
undue ini'luence 11 ( 156 ) which makes it voidable at the suit of one 
of the parties. 
The other procedure open to the party rescinding is to 
treat the other party's breach as a repudiation of the contract. 
Here the party has a right to sue on the breach for damages but 
he has discharged himself as to the performance of future oblig-
ations. If however he decides to affirm the contract, he can 
claim damages but he must perform his future obligations. 
Francis Dawson\ 157 ) in apparent appreciation of the dis-
tinction between the two heads of recission, states that the 
difference between them lies initially in the origin of the 
claim. Recission in its strict sense implies that the contract 
is rescinded ab initio and is deemed never to have existed. The 
innocent party can have no right to recover damages on the con-
tract because it no longer exists, but he could seek restit-
ution on the grounds that the defaul ting party would be unjustly 
enriched. He is thereby to be returned to his original position 
as if the contract had never existed. 
On the other hand when the defaulting party co~ni tted a 
serious breach of the contract the innocent party was entitled 
to maintain an action on the contract for damages. The measure 
for recovery was the sum that placed the innocent party into 
the position he would have been in had the contract been per-
formed. 
Dawson suggests that such an option as to the forms of 
(156) 'Mr. Cyprian Williams' Great ~eresy' by Michael Albery 
(157) Francis Dawson 1976 39 Mod. L.R. 215 Recission & Damages. 
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action available is open to the innocent party. When the term 
recission is used it ·must be examined in the light of what the 
party intended. Such intention may be shown through evidence of 
correspondence as took place between the parties, but it is 
entirely relative to individual circumstances. To review the 
institution of recission in terms of intention is a preferable 
method of analysis than that given by Albery - as to initial 
invalidity and serious breach. The denial of damages in assoc-
iation with pleading recission may also relate to the confusion 
that has arisen over the question of granting restorative 
instead of substitutive damages. Primarily in a claim for 
recission ab initio the innocent party intended to protect his 
restitutional interest and to prevent unjust enrichment. The 
innocent party was also entitled to a sum of "limited damages 11 <
158) 
which enabled him to be "restored to his formed position in the 
same way as if the contract had never been made. 11 <159 ) Dawson 
suegests that such damages appear to be for "the protection 
interest by an action on the contract11 .C 160) 
If recission in its strictest sense is to prevent unjust 
enrichment then why "should we artificially extend the concept 
of a valuable benefit to permit the recovery of some reliance 
expenditure11 .< 161 ) He concludes that rather than award drunages 
under the guise of protecting a restitutional interest - when 
they are substitutive in form - it is better to allow an alter-
native contra ctual remedy. Recission can therefore allow a 
contemporous claim for damages. 
(158) Horser v. Zorro (1 975) 2 W.L.R. 183 at p .1 95 (j) ii~~arry J. 
(159) Ibid p.195(d) 
( 160) 1975 39 Mod . L.R. p.217 
(161) Ibid p.218-219. 
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WHAT IS THE POSITION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND NEW ZEALAND? 
The case of Horsler v. Zorro reiterated the traditional 
view that recission and damages are incompatible. Metgarry J. 
only acknowledges the strict form of recission with its assoc-
iated restitutio in integrum. This case has been the subject 
of severe criticism by M. Albery in his article.( 162 ) Not only 
does he suggest that Megarry J. was wrong to deny recission 
plus damages but he also revealed inconsistant principles put 
forward in that judgement. 
Megarry J. recognised only two forms of remedial action 
available for the innocent party to rescind the contract ab 
initio, or affirm it and claim damages for its breach. He also 
stated "if a vendor repudiates the contract the purchaser may 
accept the contract as at an end and sue for damages for the 
breach of the contract11 .( 163) The question that confused Albery 
was whether the above statement meant that acceptance of repud-
iation really refers to the affirmation of the contract . Such 
a formulation would in Albery's eyes "be a Eovel statement of 
the law without support either in principle or authority11 .( 164 ) 
The recent English Court of Appeal decision of Capi tal v. Sub-
urban Properties Ltd., swycher & Others( 165) however recognises 
the right to rescind a contract and recover damages. "If he 
pursues this common law remedy , he does so on the basis that he 
is no longer obliged to perform the contract, and he recovers 
damages on the footing that he will not do so and will retain 
the property agreed to be sold".( 166) And further on, "the 
(162) 
( 163) 
( 164) 
( 165) 
( 166) 
1975 91 L.Q.R. 837 
(1 975) 2 w.L.R.183 at p.187 
1975 91 L.Q.R. 837 at p.854 
f1976) 1 All ER p.881 
Ibid p.885(j) (g) per Buckley L.J. 
.... 
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word rescind does not import treating the contract at an end •••.• 
it means the vendor is no longer bound to perform his part of 
the contract in con.sequence of the purchaser's repudiation. ( 167) 
Sir John Pennycuick also recognised the two forms of recission 
and stated that the use of the word 'recission' sometimes causes 
confusion.<
168
) Although the above comments are dicta - they 
represent the correct or preferable statement as to the law. In 
the New Zealand case of Hunt v. Hyde( 169) the vendor rescinded 
the contract following the purchaser's repudiation of it. 
~ Casey J. refused to follow Horsler v. Zorro< 170) and instead 
held "it is now established that the word recission can also 
refer to an action of an innocent party accepting repudiation 
by the other" with its consequence of discharging him from 
further performance of the contract but still leaving intact 
the right to claim damages.< 171 ) The authority upon which he 
based his assertion was the decision of White v. Ross< 172 ) the 
articles hereto mentioned.< 173 ) The question as to which sense 
of the word is being used by the innocent party depends on the 
evidence presented. In that case, as time was expressed to be 
of the essence of the contract, and the purchaser did not com-
plete payment at the approved date - it was held a serious enough 
breach had been committed so as to entitle the vendor to accept 
the purchaser's actions as a repudiation of the contract. "Such 
a repudiation is one confirmed by the law and is not dependent 
on any express or implied term of the contract 11 .< 174) The vendor 
was thereby entitled to be placed in the same position financially 
as if the contract had been performed. Damages were extended to 
( 167) 
( 168) 
( 169) 
( 170l (171 
( 172 
( 173) 
(174) 
(1976) 1 All ER p.886(a) 
Ibid _p.888(e) 
(1976J 2 NZLR 453 
( 1 9 7 5) 2 W • L • R • 1 8 3 
(1976) 2 NZLR 453 p.457 
(1960) NZLR 24 7 
1975 91 LQR 83 7 William Gumrnow 92 LQR 
(1976) 2 NZLR 453 at p.458 (30-35) 
Francis Dawson 1976 
30 Mod.LR.214 
- 49 -
cover the loss of the bargain estimated to be the difference 
between the contract price and present value. If the contract 
contains express provisions as to the payment of damages, the 
courts will give effect to them. The word 'rescind' may be 
used in whatever meaning the contract gives it. I see no 
reason why those terms should not contain an agreement for the 
payment of some sum by one to the other which may or may not be 
called damages.( 175 ) 
What is the position of the deposit when a contract is 
~ 
rescinded? The parties may expressly stipulate for the forfeit-
ure of a deposit. If so the courts will give effect to such a 
term - unless of course the deposit is in the nature of a penalty. 
The deposit is however generally forfeited on recission as a 
matter of common practice. To rescind a contract ab initio -
then by the equitable doctrine of restitutio integrum - the 
parties should be restored as far as possible to their original 
' 
positions. All benefits conferred during the course of the con-
tractual negotiations are to be restored to the parties who 
gave them. The general right of forfeiture, however, operates 
as an exception to this equitable doctrine. The reasons why 
this unique situation arises are founded on policy consideratjons. 
The deposit is given as a guarantee for the performance of the 
contract. If the purchaser defaults, then as an automatic con-
sequence he loses it. It is compensatory sum - awarded to the 
vendor - even if he has suffered no real loss - except perhaps 
the inconvenience and the loss of an opportunity to secure the 
contract with another. · 
Megarry J. in Horsler v. Zorro sugges ts another reason why 
(175) Horsler v. Zorro (19751 2 W.L.R. 183 at p.191 
.... 
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this situation exists - the deposit forms a pledge of perform-
ance. ( 
176
) This ana_logy of the deposit to some form of possess-
ory lien is certainly an acceptable interpretation, especially 
when it is discussed in the realm of the recoverability of 
unpaid deposits. 
The second form of recission is that which entitles the 
innocent party to treat himself as discharged from future oblig-
ations of the contract i.e. "one party is not bound to perform 
thos e promises which are dependent on the performance by the 
other party of his promises11 .C 17;;r) Such a right is however not 
retrospective and any rights and obligations that existed prior 
to the breach still remain. If this principle is applied to the 
rights - relating to unpaid deposits - it would appear the 
deposit once again exists as an exception to a general rule. 
The ri ght to recover damages raises the question whether 
it is fair to forfeit the deposit in addition. This leads on to 
the question of whether ~he vendor should have this general 
right of forfeiture. A.A. Zuckerman( 178) contended t hat the 
law is not all that satisfactory in this respect. The courts 
have restrictively interpreted and exercised the application 
of s.49 (2) of the Law of Property Act which grants them equit-
able jurisdiction to order the repayment of a deposit. He goes 
on to state that the comment made by Mullin J. in Johnson v. 
Jones that 11 a vendor who f ails to get in the amount of the 
d€poijit (before rescinding) loses t he benefit of a possible 
windfall should the purchaser default". ( 179) should be applied 
to the situation even when a vendor secures a deposit before 
( 176) 
(177) 
( 178) 
( 179) 
(1 975] 2 WLR 183 at p .1 94 
Francis Dawson 'Rescission & Damages' 1976 39 Mod . LR . p . 217 
WLR Vol.38 May 1975 - 349 at p .354 
[1972] NZLR 313 at p .317-318 
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rescission. Such a statement may be perfectly feasible 
especially in cases where a vendor has suffered no visible 
loss. There seems no reason why a vendor should be recouped 
for losses he did not sustain or secure a benefit under a con-
tract that is no lone;er operative. "After all the purchaser 
does not have this protection11 <180) of being able to get this 
loss should the vendor default. 
Specific Performance. 
"A decree if specific performance is a decree issued by th_e 
court which constrains a contracting party to do that which he 
has promised to do. It is a form of relief that is purely 
equitable in origin11 .< 181 ) The party may obtain such a decree 
at the discre tion of the Supreme Court.< 182 ) 
Under S.2 of the Chancery Amendment Act 1958( 183 ) the High 
Court is not vested with the jurisdiction to award damages in 
addition to or in substitution for specific performanc~. No 
such comparative rights arise under the common law. It was 
' held in Horsler v. Zorro tha t as the plaintiffs writ was amended 
so that the claim for specifi c performance was deleted no 
damages could be awarded in substitution of it.< 184) There 
are obvious difficulties in awarding drunages as a substitute for 
what is not even claimed .< 185 ) This statement was criticised 
by Albery who contended, "why should not a plaintiff plead 
facts entitling him to specific performance and then claim and 
obtain damages in lieu of specific performance without claim-
( 180) 
( 181) 
( 1 82 ) 
( 183) 
( 184) 
( 1 85) 
MLR Vol.38 May 1975 349 at p .354 
Cheshire v. Fifoot - Law of Contract 4th edition p.520 
Lruuare v. Dixon (1 873) L.R. 6 HL.414 p.423 Ld . Chelmsford 
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ing specific performance where it is fruitless to do so."( 188) 
He bases his contention on an interpretation of Lord CMrns 
Act - that it did hot give jurisdiction to award damages in all 
cases in which specific performance is claimed but in all cases 
in which the court of Chancery has jurisdiction to entertain 
an application for specific performance. This seems to be a 
perfectly feasible contention. 
The Court of Appeal decision in Capital & Surburban Prop-
erties v. Swycher and Others< 187) decided another important 
point. There it was held that if a vendor elects at trial to· 
pursue a decree of specific performance he cannot thereafter, 
following a failure to comply with the decree turn around and 
sue for common law damages. "A vendor is entitled to rescind 
the contract if the purchaser fails to comply with a decree of 
specific performance, he may forfeit the deposit and claim any 
monetary relief which may avail to him under the terms of the 
contract 11 .< 188 ) The vendor however does not acquire anew the 
right to claim damages at common law.< 189 ) 
It would appear to follow as a consequence of these 
decisions the form of the writ claimed is a crucial consider-
ation when in pursuance of available remedies. But in any event 
the deposit is forfeited( 190) or retained by the vendor should 
he elect to pursue either course. In the assessment of drunages -
the amount of the deposit is always credited. It can therefore 
be looked upon as a compensatory sum. 
Recovery of unpaid deposit by a non-defaulting vendor. 
( 186) 
( 187) 
( 188) 
( 189) 
( 190) 
The vendor has a right to recover the deposit if it has 
Albery 1975 91 LQR 837 at p . 853 
(1976) 1 All ER. 881 
Ibid p.885(j) per Buckley L.J. 
Ibid p.887(e) per Pennycuick V.C. 
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been stipulated for under the contract. Yet he cannot sue to 
recover any part of the deposit which has not been paid to him 
after the breach has occurred and he has rescinded that contract 
on the grounds of that breach.< 191 ) This was the English decision 
of Lowe v. Hope and the grounds for the decision was as follows: 
"it would I think be quite contrary to principle that a vendor 
having rescinded a contract so that the contract is at an end 
should not at any stage be entitled to insist that the purchaser 
should hand over to him a contract pledge with a view to its 
forfeiture 11 .< 192 ) Pennycuick in that case obviously had in 
mind the form of rescission ab initio. For if rescission is 
accepted in its looser form - as to acceptance of the other 
party's repudiation of the contra ct, obligations under the con-
tract are discharged as to the future only. Obligations that 
have accrued prior to the rescission are still viable to en-
forcement or performance. 
It would appear however following the New Zealand case of 
Johnson v. Jones( 193 ) the denial of t he recoverability of unpaid 
deposits following re s cissi on woul d exist as an exception to 
this second form or common law definition of rescission. 
The unique characteristic of the deposit however would s eem 
to have had a plausible expl anation - if it is expl a ined in 
terms as expressed by McMullin J. in Johnson v. Jones: 11 the 
very nature of the deposit is such that before it can be for-
feited it must first be paid" i.e. it must be held in possession 
if it is to operate at a11.< 194 ) 
( 191) 
( 192) 
( 193) 
( 194) 
Brian Coote sta tes followine; as fr om this comment 11 the 
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(1972] NZLR 313 
Ibid p.317 
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essential ~uestion then becomes whether a possessory rule used 
to justify retention of the deposit as an exception to restit-
utio integrum should be denied recovery as an exception to a 
quite different rule that rights accruing before termination 
should remain enforceable thereunder11 .< 195) Coote suggests 
that in logic one does not follow the other but really it is a 
policy question that is resolved individually according to one's 
view of the inviolability of contractual obligations. 
This sentiment is clearly borne out in the various judg-
rnents relating to this issu~. In the early decision of Dewar v. 
Mintoff( 196 ) in which it was held a vendor had such a right of 
recoverability, Horridge J. based his decision on the policy 
consideration that the defendant could not put himself in a 
better position by refusing to pay a deposit than if the deposit 
had in fact been paid.< 197) In the recent case of Myton Ltd. v. 
~chwab Morris< 19B) Goulding J. expressed favourable comments 
Lowards that decisi6n and considered it to be still applicable 
despite the later deci s ion of Lowe v. Hope.< 199) Although those 
comments were dicta and the case was resolved on other grounds, 
the sentiment he expressed is understandable in light of the 
importance and emphasis he attached to the deposit as a con-
tractual provision, terming it a condition precedent. 
Policy considerations of a quite different nature were 
expressed by McMullin J. in Johnson v. Jones( 200) where he 
looked upon the deposit as:representing a possible windfall to 
the vendor. Whatever the.final answer is to this issue will 
(1 95 ) 'Recovery of unpaid deposits' 1973 5 NZULR p .294 
(1 96 ) (1 912] 1 All ER 326 
(1 97 ) Ibid p.387-388 
(198) (1974] 1 All ER 326 at p.331-332 
(199) (1970) Ch.94 
(200) (1972) NZLR 313 
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obviously be determined by what status is attributed to the 
deposit by the various judicial quarters.< 201 ) 
Following the decision of Pollway v. Abdullah< 202 ) however, 
if a deposit is paid by cheque (which is subsequently dishon-
oured) into the hands of an auctioneer he is entitled to sue 
for its recovery. The grounds for that decision - where the 
auctioneers were the named payees of the cheque, and their 
warranty of authority to collect the cheque - was the consider-
ation for its payment. A.A.S. Zuckerman states that this 
decision is an acceptable exception from the general rul~ laid 
down in Lowe v. Hope because of the delicate nature of cheques. 
If the payment of cheques were to be held irrecoverable then 
" people would be reluctant to accept them in lieu of cash11 .< 203 ) 
He also concludes that the vendors should have been able to sue 
on the cheque in the auctioneer's name as they were acting as 
his agents. This is a perfectly acceptable decision in view of 
the fact that had the purchaser paid in cash the deposit would 
have been forfeited. 
Recovery of the deposit by the purchaser. 
The purchaser is entitled as a right to recover his deposit 
paid as earnest money if no concluded or binding contract has 
been entered into.< 204 ) He is also entitled to recover it upon 
such default of the vendor as entitles the purchaser to repudiate 
the contract. The purchaser must not however be in any way 
responsible for the default. He may in special circwastances 
be entitled to the interest accrued on the deposit normally at 
four percent and also his costs of investigating the title.( 205 ) 
( 201) 
( 202) 
( 203) 
( 204 ) 
( 205) 
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The grounds for recovery may be as follows: the vendor's 
title is defective in some way. The onus is on the purchaser 
to prove the title · is bad and if it is not ratified by the time 
fixed for completion the purchaser is entitled to recover his 
deposit. Delay by the vendor may also be grounds for recovery. 
But unless time is expressed as of the essence of the contract 
the purchaser may serve notice on the vendor and such notice 
must be reasonable in the circumstances.( 206 ) It has been held 
that if a purchaser proceeds with negotiations he waives his 
right to complain of the delay.( 20?) Mi~description or mis-
representation by the vendor will also enable the purchaser to 
recover his deposit - provided that if the remedy of damages is 
available he will lose his right to recovery if he can be 
adequately compensated.( 20B) 
The purchaser may also recover his deposit if it is in the 
nature of a penalty and is unconscionable for the vendor to 
retain it. This has been elabo~ated on earlier in the writing. 
Recovery - a legal right. 
Formerly where there was no breach of a contract there was 
no right in law or equity to recover the deposit .( 209 ) In 1925 
in the United Kingd om S.49(2) of the Law of Property Act was 
enacted and has provided that where the court refuses to grant 
specific performance of a contract or in any action for the 
return of the deposit the court may if it thinks fit order the 
return of the deposit. Previously the purchaser could not 
recover the deposit where there was a defect to which he could 
not object by reason of a special condition or where there was 
(206) Stickney v. Keeble [1 915} AC 386 
(207) Boyes v. Liddell (1 946) 6 Jur.725 
(208) Jacobs v. Revell (1900) 2 Ch.858 
(209) Scott v. Alvarez (1895) 2 Ch.603 
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delay by the vendor which prevented the vendor from obtaining a 
decree of specific performance but did not render him liable to 
be ordered to return the deposit( 21 O) . But in 1hose cases the 
court now has the discretion to order the return of the deposit. 
Megarry v. Wade(
211 ) suggests that such a discretion makes very 
little difference in practice. It states a deposit is forfeited 
only when the purchaser is in breach of the contract and whether 
the court will exercise its d&scretion to relieve such a person 
from his liability is doubtful. Hereto the discretion has only 
been exercised in cases where the purchaser could have rescinded( 21 · 
(where there was a misrepresentation by the vendor). It is a 
useful means of restoring deposits without going into the 
technicalities of rescission. 
New Zealand does not possess a comparable section. The 
consequences of this would be that the court could not intervene 
in circumstances where the deposit is unable to be recovered such 
as when he has bound himself to a special condition to accept 
the title of the vendor though it turn out to be defective.< 213 ) 
Purchasers' lien. 
Where the purchaser has pa.id a deposit and the contract 
goes off for any cause than this f aul t he has an equitable lien 
on the property sold for his deposit.( 214 ) 
As has been previously mentioned the deposit possesses 
some unique characteristics whi lst performing its role in the 
area of forfeiture, recovery and the initial negotiations of 
entry into the contract. Because of the consequences that 
follow from its payment or forfe iture a need for certainty of 
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its terms· is required for all parties concerned. It is 
suggested as a reformative measure that such certainty may be 
obtained, at least to a certain degree, if a form of statutory 
conditions of sale were to be adopted.< 215) Such conditions 
would incorporate terms as to the amount of the deposit, what 
status its ·receiver would have, and the results that would 
follow rescission. Parties would be at liberty to incorporate 
the standard conditions of sale in their contract, and should 
events arise concerning the deposit, it could be safely assumed 
that all involved are aware of the significance and role that 
the deposit plays. As a consequence of that consideration dis-
putes such as over the liability of vendors for estate agents' 
dishonest actions could be easily resolved. As deposits are 
almost always paid in contracts for the sale and purchase of 
land this need for certainty would appear to be a highly 
desirable consideration, especially as it would tend to mitigate 
' 
against the uniqueness of its character. 
(215) Such as a statutory enactment of the recommendations 
made by the property law and equity Reform Committee 
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